Russia strengthens presence in Africa, but strategy does not go through Angola

O researcher Rui Verde says that Russia is strengthening its presence in southern Africa, but the strategy no longer goes through Angola, but through other regional alternatives, in particular Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Rui Verde published today on the page of CEDESA, the center for studies and research on Angola, an analysis of Russian reinforcement in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRCongo), countries that are also important for Angola, based on initiatives that took place during the Third Russian-Africa Summit in Moscow on 28 and 29 October.

For the jurist, this summit “was more than a symbolic exercise of public relations by the Kremlin”, resulting in a significant acceleration of Russian diplomacy in Southern Africa, where Angola’s growing alignment with the United States, the European Union and Western institutions was evidenced, while Russia is building influence throughout the strategic space surrounding Angola.

“What emerges is a framework of potential relative siege of Angola in the face of a regional recomposition where Moscow is once again a relevant actor,” he says.

Rui Verde highlights the presence in Moscow of Mozambican President Daniel Chapo, a visit that has resulted in the deepening of cooperation in the energy, mining, agriculture, transport, education, science and information technologies sectors, but, more importantly, in military training and the fight against terrorism in Cabo Delgado.

“The main political significance of the visit lies not only in the economic agreements, but in the revitalization of the security partnership between Moscow and Maputo,” writes Rui Verde, with Moscow resurfacing as a relevant military partner in this country, at a time when competition between external powers for influence in the country is intensified.

Equally relevant is convergence in the energy sector, as Mozambique has become one of the world's leading natural gas poles and Mozambican authorities have been expressing interest in deepening contacts with Russian giants such as Gazprom, Rosneft and Novatek, says Rui Verde.

Moscow thus regains space in a country that controls important Indian maritime corridors, has huge gas reserves and is a projection platform for all of Southern Africa, says the researcher.

On the other hand, he says, the DRCongo constitutes a more significant development from the Angolan point of view.

During the visit of President Félix Tshisekedi to Moscow, reads in the analysis, three instruments of cooperation were signed between DRCongo and Russia, in the area of economic, commercial, scientific and technological cooperation and in the area of health and education, which institutionalized a strategic partnership between Moscow and Kinshasa, where Russia had a relatively limited presence when compared to China, the United States or the European Union.

Rui Verde states that the Congolese Presidency presented the visit as part of a deliberate strategy for diversifying international alliances, but also explicitly called on Russia to play a more active role in stabilising the east of the country.

“This represents an important change. For decades, the DRC’s main international security interlocutors have been Angola, the United States, France, Belgium and the United Nations,” the analyst said.

Angola, since the beginning of the Ukraine war, has gradually sought to distance itself from Russia, while significantly deepening cooperation with the United States and the European Union, and the Lobito Corridor has become the ultimate symbol of this strategic reorientation.

“The Russian response now seems to go through the construction of a network of relations around Angola,” notes Rui Verde, stressing that Angola no longer benefited from the privileged position it held with Russia for decades, especially during the Cold War, when Angola was perhaps the main Soviet ally in Africa.

This does not mean that Angola is faced with a direct threat or immediate diplomatic isolation, but, says the academic, “the evolution of last week demonstrates that Moscow is developing regional alternatives” rather than relying on Angola as the main partner in Southern Africa.

Russia seems to be betting on a multi-point support strategy where Mozambique offers gas, access to Indian and military cooperation, while DRCongo offers critical minerals, continental dimension and geographical centrality.

Rui Verde concludes that Russia is returning to southern Africa through a regional strategy that no longer passes through Angola.

“ By the general elections of 2027, Angola will do little more in terms of foreign policy. From there, you will have to evaluate your international paths and your alliances in a fast-moving world ", summarizes.